From: A systematic review of RFID applications and diffusion: key areas and public policy issues
Paper | Year | Category | Contents |
---|---|---|---|
Hwang et al. | Cloning | The attacker can read the tag and then clone the tag by writing all the obtained data into other | |
Eavesdropping | The attacker surreptitiously listens to all the communications between the reader and the tag | ||
Replay attack | The attacker repeats or delays the same message when valid data are transmitted | ||
Denial of Service | The attacker can send massive message to RFID system and attempt to crash the RFID system | ||
Forward Security | The attacker can compromise a tag and obtain its current relation date | ||
Tag tracing | The tag always broadcasts a fixed serial number to somewhere nearby the reader; therefore, the adversary can identify a fixed serial number of the tag from different locations or transaction records | ||
Individual data privacy | The hacker can know what items the consumer bought from the store or what books the consumer borrowed from the library | ||
Data forging | The attacker can modify the dates, items, and prices and then cause great loss if the tag can store extra data | ||
Numann and Hogben | 2008 | Skimming | The attacker opens a clan-destine connection to the chip and gains access to the data |
Eavesdropping | The attacker intercepts the communication between the chip and an authorized reader | ||
Location tracking | The attacker generates person or card-specific movement profiles. |